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According to the consensus view in growth and development economics, cross country differences
in per-capita income largely reflect differences in countries' total factor productivity. We argue that
this view has powerful implications for patterns of capital flows: everything else equal, countries with
faster productivity growth should invest more, and attract more foreign capital. We then show that
the pattern of net capital flows across developing countries is not consistent with this prediction. If
anything, capital seems to flow more to countries that invest and grow less. We argue that this result
-- which we call the allocation puzzle -- constitutes an important challenge for economic research,
and discuss some possible research avenues to solve the puzzle.
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Between the years 1980 and 2000, the investment to GDP ratio averaged 32 percent in Korea
and only 2.8 percent in Madagascar. Over the same period, Korea experienced an economic
miracle, with a growth rate of output per worker of 5.4 percent per year, whereas Mada-
gascar was less successful|output per worker declined by 1.3 percent per year. By 2000,
PPP-adjusted output per worker reached $22,022 in Korea and only $1,599 in Madagascar.
Modern growth theory teaches us how to interpret such enormous dierences in economic
performance. Hall and Jones (1999) and the subsequent literature on development account-
ing (see Caselli (2004)) argue conclusively that a substantial share of the dierences in output
per worker can be attributed to productivity. Indeed, standard growth decomposition ex-
ercises tell us that total factor productivity grew by 4.5 percent per year in Korea between
1980 and 2000, whereas it fell by 1.1 percent per year in Madagascar.
What does this imply for international capital ows? The standard growth model delivers
an unambiguous answer to this question. High productivity growth in countries like Korea
increases the marginal product of capital, which stimulates investment. Korea should have
nanced a share of its rapidly growing capital stock with foreign capital. Madagascar,
facing no or little upward growth prospects, should have attracted much less foreign capital.
Consider what happened instead. Between 1980 and 2000, both countries relaxed restrictions
on international nancial transactions.1 Yet Korea received almost no net capital inows.
In Madagascar, by contrast, net capital inows averaged 6 percent of output.
Figure 1 documents the same pattern across a large number of developing countries. It
shows that the average share of net capital inows in GDP between 1980 and 2000 (on the
vertical axis) is negatively correlated with the investment-to-GDP ratio (on the horizontal
axis). Far from being outliers, Korea and Madagascar are typical of the cross-country cor-
relation between investment and capital inows shown in Figure 1. Both countries are close
to the regression line. If investment and capital ows were driven primarily by changes in
1Chinn and Ito's (2007) index of nancial openness between 1970 and 1989 was 22 in Korea (resp. 15.4
in Madagascar), and 31.6 (resp. 28.6) between 1989 and 2005. The index runs from 0 (less open) to 100
(more open).
1domestic productivity, as suggested by the development accounting literature, countries that
invest more should receive more capital from abroad. We observe the exact opposite.
Patterns such as Figure 1 are just one illustration of a range of results that point in the
same direction: standard models do not account for the allocation of international capital
ows across developing countries. Capital ows from rich to poor countries are not only low
(as argued by Lucas (1990)), but their allocation across developing countries is the opposite
of the predictions of standard textbook models: capital does not ow more to the countries
that have a higher marginal product of capital. We argue that the pattern of capital ows
across developing countries constitutes a major puzzle and its resolution is a challenge for
international economics. We call it the allocation puzzle.
The allocation puzzle is dierent from the Lucas puzzle, which is about the small size
of capital ows from rich to poor countries (Lucas (1990)). In terms of Figure 1, the Lucas
puzzle is that capital inows amount to a relatively small share of GDP on average (3.9 per-
cent in our sample). We will show, in the context of our calibrated model, that the small size
of aggregate capital ows toward developing countries as a whole is not especially puzzling
given the relatively low rate of productivity growth in these countries. This explanation is
consistent with Lucas' original hypothesis: capital ows to poor countries are low because
these countries are not very productive and face domestic distortions in the return to capital.
Our puzzle is related to the allocation of the capital ows across developing countries
rather than their overall level. Our calibrated open economy growth model predicts large
capital inows to Asia and large capital outows from Latin America and Africa. This rather
provocative result reects a straightforward implication of a standard open economy growth
model: the countries whose productivity declines relative to the rest of the world should
export, not import capital. By contrast, in the data, we observe that capital has owed to
all three regions, and more so (in proportion of investment or GDP) to Africa and Latin
America than to Asia.
Section 2 presents the model that we use to predict the volume and allocation of capital
ows to developing countries. We use, as a starting point, a simple frictionless small open
2economy model in the tradition of Ramsey, Cass and Koopmans. The model assumes that
countries start at some distance of the world technology frontier, and may|for reasons
that are outside of the model|catch up or fall behind relative to the frontier. We derive
a closed-form expression showing how the volume of net capital inows toward a given
country depends on the country's exogenous characteristics (initial debt, capital scarcity,
and productivity). The model predicts that capital should ow more toward the countries
with higher productivity growth to nance both investment and consumption.
Section 3 then calibrates the model using Penn World Table (PWT) data on investment
and output for 69 developing countries over 1980-2000, a period that is long enough to
look at long-run dierences in growth, and during which there was a fair degree of capital
mobility. We nd that the average developing country was not very capital scarce in 1980,
and did not catch up relative to the world technology fontier, potentially explaining the small
observed size of capital ows from rich to poor countries. We also nd that the cross-country
allocation of capital ows is always the opposite of that predicted by the model: countries
with faster productivity growth attract less capital. This is the allocation puzzle.
Although there are various ways to make the basic model more realistic, we argue in
section 4 that many of these changes do not help explain the allocation puzzle. Lack of
perfect foresight or international nancial frictions may mute the volume of international
capital ows, but should not change their direction or their allocation across countries.
Our results are also robust to the introduction of non-reproducible capital (land) into the
model, an extension which Caselli and Feyrer (2007) have shown to be potentially important
in estimating international dierences in the return to capital. Finally, we show that the
allocation puzzle is not accounted for by aid ows, whose behavior may not be appropriately
captured by the basic neoclassical model.
What can, then, explain the puzzling allocation of capital ows across developing coun-
tries? Although the main purpose of this paper is to establish a puzzle rather than solve it,
we oer in section 5 some thoughts on possible explanations. We distinguish three possible
approaches, which put the spotlight respectively on the link between savings and growth,
the link between trade and growth, and the link between nancial development and growth.
3No attempt is made to discriminate empirically between these explanations|the objective
of that section being merely to propose a roadmap to think about future research rather
than establishing new results.
This paper lies at the conuence of dierent lines of literature. First, it contributes to
the literature on the determinants of capital inows to developing countries, and on the role
of capital ows in economic development. Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004) construct
a self-nancing ratio indicating what would have been the counterfactual stock of capital in
the absence of capital inows. They nd that 90 percent of the stock of capital in developing
countries is self-nanced, and that countries with higher self-nancing ratios grew faster in
the 1990s. Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) also document a negative cross-country
correlation between the ratio of capital inows to GDP and growth, and discuss possible
explanations for this nding. Manzocchi and Martin (1997) empirically test an equation
for capital inows derived from an open-economy growth model on cross-section data for 33
developing countries|and nd relatively weak support.
This paper is related to the literature on relationship between growth and the current
account in developing countries. Emerging market business cycles exhibit countercyclical
current accounts, i.e., the current account balance tends to decrease when growth picks up
(see Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)). We show in this paper that the correlation between
growth and the current account is the opposite when it is considered across countries and
over a long time period. Because of the very low frequency at which we look at the data, a
more natural benchmark of comparison is the literature on transitional growth dynamics pio-
neered by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). King and Rebelo (1993) also examine transition
dynamics in a variety of neoclassical growth model. Unlike these papers, we allow countries
to catch up or fall behind relative to the world frontier and focus on the implications of the
theory for international capital ows.
The paper is also related to the literature on savings, growth, and investment. The liter-
ature on savings and growth has established a positive correlation between these variables,
which is puzzling from the point of view of the permanent income hypothesis since high-
4growth countries should borrow abroad against future income to nance a higher level of
consumption (Carroll and Summers (1991), Carroll and Weil (1994)). Starting with Feldstein
and Horioka (1980), the literature has also established a stronly positive correlation between
savings and investment, which seems dicult to reconcile with free capital mobility. The
allocation puzzle presented in this paper is related to both puzzles, but it is stronger. Our
nding is that the dierence between savings and investment (capital outows) is positively
correlated with productivity growth, which means that savings not only has to be positively
correlated with productivity growth, but the correlation must be stronger than that between
investment and productivity growth.
Finally this paper belongs to a small set of contributions that look at the implications
of the recent \development accounting" literature for international economics. Our model
and calibration methods are closely related to that literature|although in this paper we
do not consider human capital explicitly|which has emphasized productivity growth as the
main proximate cause of economic development. This view has implications for the behavior
of capital ows that have not been systematically explored in the literature (by contrast
with investment, whose relationship with productivity is well understood and documented).
In a related contribution that is discussed in more detail in section 4, Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) show that the return to capital, once properly measured in a development accounting
framework, is very similar in advanced and developing countries, which might explain why
we observe so little capital ow from the former to the latter. In Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2006) we use a development accounting framework similar to that in this paper to quantify
the welfare gains from capital mobility|and nd them to be relatively small. In this paper,
by contrast, we look at the positive implications of development accounting for the direction
of capital ows. Our paper is the rst, to our knowledge, to quantify the level of capital
ows to developing countries in a calibrated open economy growth model and compare it to
the data.
52 Capital Flows in the Neoclassical Growth Model
The neoclassical growth framework postulates that the dynamics of growth are driven by
an exogenous productivity path. In this section we derive the implications of this view for
capital ows, i.e., we show how the capital ows to developing countries are determined
by their productivity paths relative to the world technology frontier. For simplicity, we
abstract from global general equilibrium eects and assume that each developing country
can be viewed as a small open economy taking the world interest rate as given. Thus, the
model features only one country, and the rest of the world.
2.1 The model
Consider a small open economy that can borrow and lend at an exogenously given world
gross real interest rate R. Time is discrete and, for the time being, there is no uncertainty.
The population Nt grows at an exogenous rate n: Nt = ntN0. Like in Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995) the population can be viewed as a continuum of identical families whose





s Nt+s u(ct+s); (1)
where ct denotes consumption per capita (more generally, lower case variables are normalized
by population) and u(c)  (c1    1)=(1   ) is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function with coecient  > 0. The number of families is normalized to 1, so that
per family and aggregate variables are the same.
The economy produces a single homogeneous good using two inputs, capital and labor,




1  ; 0 <  < 1; (2)
where Kt is the stock of domestic physical capital, Lt the labor supply, and At the level of
productivity. The labor supply is exogenous and equal to the population (Lt = Nt). Factor
6markets are perfectly competitive so each factor is paid its marginal product.
Denote by Rt the marginal product of capital, net of depreciation:
Rt = (kt=At)
 1 + 1   : (3)
In order to account for long-run cross country dierences in investment rates, we assume
a distortion  in the return to capital. Specically, we assume that investors receive only
a fraction (1   ) of the gross return on capital Rt: We call  the `capital wedge'. It is a
short hand for the gap between the gross social return to capital Rt and the private return.
One can interpret  as a tax on gross capital income, or as the result of other distortions|
credit market imperfections, expropriation risk, bureaucracy, bribery, and corruption|that
would also introduce a `wedge' between social and private returns. In order to focus on the
distortive aspects, the revenue per capita zt = Rtkt generated by this wedge are rebated in
a lump sum fashion.
The representative resident issues external debt dt and owns all the domestic capital
kt. We assume perfect nancial integration, i.e., the representative resident can borrow and
lend at the world interest rate R. Given our assumptions, the budget constraint of the
representative family is:
Ntct + Nt+1kt+1 + R
Ntdt = (1   )RtNtkt + Nt+1dt+1 + Ntwt + Ntzt; (4)




The representative resident maximizes the welfare function (1) under the budget con-







implies that consumption per capita grows at the constant rate (R)1=. In addition, capital
mobility implies that the private return on domestic capital and the world real interest rate
are equal:
(1   )Rt = R
: (6)
7Substituting this into the expression for the gross return on capital (3), we obtain that
the capital stock per ecient unit of labor ~ k = k=A is constant and equal to:




R=(1   ) +    1
1=1 
; (7)
(`tilde-variables' will denote per capita variables in eciency units: ~ x = X=AN).
Equation (7) makes clear that the capital wedge  is the only source of variation in
the steady state capital stock per ecient unit of labor across countries: A higher wedge,
equivalent to a higher implicit tax on capital, depresses domestic capital accumulation and
lowers ~ k:
The country has an exogenous, deterministic productivity path (At)t=0;::;+1, which is







The world productivity frontier reects the advancement of knowledge, which is not country
specic, and is assumed to grow at a constant rate g.
Domestic productivity could grow at a rate that is higher or lower than g. In order to
describe how domestic productivity evolves relative to the world frontier, it is convenient to





We assume that  = limt!1 t is well dened. The limit  measures the country's long run
technological catch-up relative to the world frontier. If  = 0; the country's productivity
remains unchanged relative to the world frontier. When  > 0; the country catches up
relative to the frontier. When  < 0; the country falls further behind. Domestic productivity
converges to a fraction (1 + )A0=A
0 of the world frontier, and the growth rate of domestic
productivity converges to g.2
2That countries have the same long-run growth rate is a standard assumption. Models of idea ows
such as Parente and Prescott (2000) or Eaton and Kortum (1999) imply a common long-run growth rate of
productivity.




This, together with the Euler equation (5), implies that domestic consumption per capita
grows at rate g : ct+1 = gct. Although not crucial for our results, this assumption simplies
the analysis by ensuring that the domestic economy converges toward a steady growth path
in which consumption and output per capita grow at the same rate. Equation (8) holds if the
rest of the world is composed of advanced economies that have the same preferences as the
small economy under consideration, but have already achieved their steady state. This is a
natural assumption to make, given that we explain capital ows by cross-country dierences
in productivity, rather than preferences.
A country is characterized by an initial capital stock per capita k0; debt d0; population
growth rate n; a productivity path fAtg
1
0 , and a capital wedge . We assume that all
countries are nancially open at time t = 0 and use the model to estimate the size and the
direction of capital ows from t = 0 onward.
2.2 Productivity and capital ows
We will compare the predictions of the model with the data observed over a nite period of
time [0;T]. Thus it makes sense to focus on cross-country dierences in the determinants of
capital ows that are observable in the time interval [0;T]. We abstract from unobserved fu-
ture developments in productivity by assuming that all countries have the same productivity
growth rate, g; after time T.
Assumption 1 (nite-time productivity catch-up) t =  for t  T:
Next, we need to dene an appropriate measure of capital inows during the time interval
[0;T]. A natural measure, in our model, is the change in external debt between 0 and T







9The normalization by initial GDP ensures that the measure is comparable across countries
of dierent sizes.3
We obtain the following proposition.






































where ~ w = (1   )~ k and ~ z = =(1   )R~ k:
Proof. See appendix A
Equation (10) implies that a country without capital scarcity (~ k0 = ~ k), without initial
debt (~ d0 = 0) and without productivity catch-up (t =  = 0) has zero capital ows. The









results from the initial capital scarcity ~ k ~ k0: Under nancial integration, and in the absence
of nancial frictions or adjustment cost of capital, the country instantly borrows and invests













reects the impact of initial debt in the presence of trend growth (ng > 1). In the absence
of productivity catch-up the economy follows a steady growth path in which external debt
remains a constant fraction of output. Expression (12) corresponds to the cumulated debt
inows that are required to keep the debt-to-output ratio constant.
3Our conclusions are robust to using alternate measures of foreign borrowing. For example, capital inows
could be measured as the average ratio of net capital inows to GDP or as the change in the ratio of net
foreign liabilities to GDP. Appendix A.2 shows that the predictions of the model are qualitatively the same
for the three measures of capital ows. Moreover, we show in the appendix that if the allocation puzzle is
observed with measure (9) then it must also hold with the two other measures. This is another reason to
use measure (9) as a benchmark when we look at the data.
10Finally, the third term in (10) reects the impact of the productivity catch-up. It can be









represents the external borrowing that goes toward nancing domestic investment. To see
this, observe that since capital per ecient unit of labor remains constant at ~ k; capital per
capita needs to increase more when there is a productivity catch-up. Without productivity
catch-up, capital at time T would be ~ kNTA0gT. Instead, it is ~ kNTAT: The dierence,





















represents the change in external debt brought about by changes in domestic saving. It is
tied to the time path of disposable income wt + zt: In general, this term depends on the
productivity path 1;2;:::;T. For simplicity we assume that the path for the ratio t= is
the same for all countries and satises t  .
Assumption 2 (common relative convergence paths) t = f(t) where f() is common
across countries and satises f(t)  1 and limt!1 f(t) = 1:
















which is proportional to the long-run productivity catch-up : Faster relative productivity
growth implies higher future income, leading to an increase in consumption and a decrease in
savings.4 Since current income is unchanged, the representative domestic consumer borrows
on the international markets.
4Obviously, savings can decrease at the same time as investment increases because of capital inows.
The Fisherian separation of savings and investment is at the core of the economics of capital ows in the
neoclassical growth model. By contrast, in a closed economy, faster productivity growth leads to additional
11This results in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider two countries A and B; identical except for their long-run productiv-
ity catch-up: A < B: Under assumptions 1 and 2, country A receives strictly less capital






To summarize, the investment and consumption channels lead to the same prediction|
that countries growing faster should borrow more.
The simplicity of the relationship between productivity and capital ows is in part driven
by the assumptions of the model. First, we assume perfect international nancial integration.
In reality, nancial frictions may limit severely|perhaps eliminate altogether|the ability of
developing countries to borrow in order to smooth consumption proles. Yet, we would argue
that, while international nancial frictions may be important, they are unlikely to reverse
the direction of capital ows, or the sign of their correlation with productivity growth. In
the presence of international nancial frictions, countries will be able to borrow less. But
countries with higher productivity growth should still be willing to borrow more, not less,
than countries with lower productivity growth. International nancial frictions can reduce
the predicted size of capital inows, but cannot make capital ow more towards the countries
that invest less|or ow less toward the countries that invest more.
Second, equation (14) assumes perfect foresight: the path of future productivity is known
with certainty as of time t = 0. Uncertainty about the future path of productivity would
dampen the willingness of the domestic household to borrow against future income. We will
consider a variant of the model with stochastic productivity in section 4.1. Again, while this
may aect the magnitude of capital ows, it should still be the case that countries that grow
more should borrow more.
Lastly, the assumption that the economy is populated by innitely-lived consumers re-
moves demographic eects from the model. Models with overlapping generations could
investment only if it successfully mobilizes national savings through higher interest rates. This is the main
reason our results are dierent from Chen, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2006) who study the Japanese
saving rate from the perspective of a closed economy.
12deliver dierent predictions for the aggregate relationship between saving and growth, and
thus modify the implications of the model for capital ows. For instance, in Modigliani's
original life cycle model, faster growth may increase aggregate savings by raising the sav-
ing of richer young cohorts relative to the dissaving of poorer older cohorts. As we have
mentioned in the introduction, other models have been developed to explain the positive
association between faster growth and national saving that is observed in the data. We will
discuss that literature in section 5. Let us simply note, for now, that when looking at the
quantitative predictions of the model, we should take the investment component (13) more
seriously than the savings component (14).
3 Capital Flow Accounting and Calibration
We look in this section whether the data support the model's prediction concerning capital
ows. To be more specic, we investigate whether developing countries with faster produc-
tivity growth and larger initial capital scarcity receive more capital inows. This requires, for
each country, estimates for the levels of initial capital scarcity and for productivity growth.
We focus on the period 1980-2000. This choice of period is motivated by two consider-
ations. First, we cannot start too early because countries need to be nancially open over
most of the period under study. Indicators of nancial openness indicate a sharp increase
starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For instance, the Chinn and Ito (2007) index
indicates an average increase in nancial openness from 31.3 in 1980 to 42.5 in 2000 for the
countries in our sample.5 Second, we want as long a sample as possible, since the focus is
on long-term capital ows. Results over shorter periods may be disproportionately aected
by nancial crisis or by uctuations in the world business cycle. Our nal sample consists
of 69 developing countries: 66 non-OECD countries, as well as Korea, Mexico and Turkey.6
A certain number of model parameters are common across countries. We assume that
a period is a year. We adopt logarithmic preferences ( = 1) and set the discount factor 
5The index is normalized to run from 0 (most closed) to 100 (most open).
6We will sometimes refer to the countries in our sample simply as non-OECD countries. For a small set
of countries, the sample period starts later and/or end earlier, due to data availability. The list of countries
and sample period are reported in appendix C.
13to 0.96.7 Next, we set the depreciation rate  to 6 percent, and the capital share of output
 equal to 0:3:8 Lastly, the growth rate of world productivity g is set to 1.017, the annual
multifactor productivity growth observed on average in the U.S. between 1980 and 2000.
Given these parameter values, the world real interest rate is equal to R   1 = 5:94 percent
per year.
The country-specic data are the paths for output, capital and productivity. Those data
come from Version 6.1 of the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten (2004)). The
capital stock Kt is constructed with the perpetual inventory method from time series data
on real investment (also from the PWT).9 From (2), we obtain the level of productivity At
as (yt=k
t )
1=(1 ) and the level of capital stock per ecient unit of labor ~ kt as (kt=yt)
1=(1 ).10
We measure n as the annual growth rate of the working-age population. Under assump-
tion 1, we can measure  as  A2000=(g20  A1980)   1, where  At is obtained as the trend com-
ponent of the Hodrick-Prescott lter of At: This detrending removes short term uctuations
in productivity due to mismeasurement or business cycle factors.11
The next step consists in constructing the steady state capital level ~ k: From equation
(7), this is equivalent to constructing the capital wedge : Our approach is to calibrate the
capital wedge so as to match exactly investment rates in the data. The next proposition
characterizes the average investment rate between 1980 and 2000.
Proposition 2 Given an initial capital stock ~ k0, productivity catch-up ; and capital wedge
; the average investment-output ratio between t = 0 and t = T   1 can be decomposed into
7The value of  matters only for the level of R, given in equation (8). Conditional on R,  does not
matter for the direction and size of capital ows.
8This assumption will be relaxed in section 4. Recent estimates by Gollin (2002) suggest that the capital
share is roughly constant within countries, and varies between 0.2 and 0.4.
9See Caselli (2004) for details. Following standard practice, we set initial capital to I=(gi + ) where I
is the initial investment level from the PWT and gi is the rate of growth of real investment for the rst 10
years of available data.
10We measure output and capital per working-age capita using data on the fraction of the population of
working age (typically ages 15 to 64) from the World Bank.





: To set the coecient of the HP lter,
we impose that the frequency gain of the lter be equal to 70 percent at the frequency corresponding to
an eight-year cycle. This choice mitigates end-point problems and concentrates on long run productivity
growth.













n + ~ k
 ()
1  (g
n +    1): (15)
Proof. See appendix A.
Equation (15) has a simple interpretation. The rst term on the right-hand side corre-
sponds to the investment at time t = 0 that is required to put capital at its equilibrium
level. This is the convergence component. The second term reects the additional invest-
ment required by the productivity catch-up. The last term is simply the usual formula for
the investment rate in steady state, with productivity growth g. It corresponds to the
investment required to oset capital depreciation, adjusted for productivity and population
growth.12
Solving numerically (15), we obtain the capital wedge  as a function of the observed
average investment rate  sk, productivity catch-up  and population growth n. Appendix C
reports the values of  sk; ; n and  for each country in our sample. Everything else equal, our
calibration approach assigns a high capital wedge to countries with low average investment
rate.
Our approach to constructing  assumes that countries are perfectly integrated. Although
international nancial frictions could bias our estimates of , this bias should not aect
the model's predictions for the direction of capital ows. In the case of a capital-scarce
country where nancial frictions maintain the domestic interest rate above the world level,
the observed investment rate will be lower than under perfect nancial integration, leading
us to overestimate the capital wedge  and thus underestimate the level of capital inows
needed to equalize returns. Symmetrically, in the case of a capital abundant country the
bias induced by nancial frictions should lead us to underestimate the capital outows. The
important point is that while there is a downward bias in the size of capital ows, the model
still predicts accurately their direction and relative magnitude.
12Observe that when g = n = 1; this last term simplies to ~ k(1 ) = ~ k=~ y:
153.1 Capital accumulation
With these caveats in mind, Table 1 decomposes the observed investment rate  sk into the
three components of equation (15). This decomposition yields a number of interesting results.
First, as is well known, investment rates vary widely across regions. They also vary with
income levels, increasing from 8.6 percent for low income countries to 28.5 percent for high-
income non-OECD countries. By construction, the model accounts exactly for observed
dierences in average investment rates. We view this as a strength of our approach: since
the model is designed to reproduce the change in the capital stock over the long run for a
large number of countries, we can assess precisely whether the drivers of capital accumulation
are also the drivers of observed capital ows.
Table 1 also contains interesting information on the factors driving capital accumulation
across countries. First, the table indicates that most of the variation in the investment
rate is accounted for by the trend component, which itself is strongly correlated with the
capital wedge  (reported in column 5). The average capital wedge is relatively large, at
11.6 percent, and decreases with income levels from 18.8 percent to 1.6 percent. To a rst
order of approximation, the countries with a high investment rate are those that maintain a
high capital-to-output ratio because of a low capital wedge.
The convergence and productivity growth components (columns 2 and 3) account for
a relatively small share of the investment rates on average. The small contribution of the
convergence component is explained by the fact that the initial capital gap was relatively
small on average at the beginning of the sample period (k0=k = 0:98). But this average
masks signicant regional disparities between Asia and Latin America, which were capital
scarce (k0=k = 0:87 and 0:94 respectively), and Africa, which was capital abundant (k0=k =
1:07). Because the countries that were capital-scarce in 1980 also tended to have a higher
productivity growth rate in the following two decades, the cumulated contribution of the
productivity and convergence components can be signicant. This is most apparent if one
compares Asia and Africa|the productivity and convergence components explain more than
half of the dierence in the investment rate between the two regions.
16Finally, the estimates of  reported in column 6 show that there is no overall productivity
catch-up with advanced countries ( is negative on average). Yet, closer inspection reveals an
interesting geographical pattern. There is some productivity catch-up in Asia, with  = 0:19;
while Latin America and Africa fell behind.13 Accordingly, the contribution of productivity
to investment is positive for Asia (1.6 percent), but negative for Africa and Latin America
(-1.2 percent and -2.7 percent respectively).
3.2 Capital ows
We now compute, for each country, the level of capital inows predicted by the model|the
right-hand side of equation (10)|and compare the model predictions with the data. There
is one measurement diculty to solve, however, before we can proceed with this comparison.
The Penn-World Tables do not not provide PPP-adjusted estimates of capital ows and
external liabilities that are comparable to the output and capital data that we have used to
calibrate the model.
The reader is referred to Appendix B for a detailed explanation of how we constructed
PPP-adjusted measures of capital ows. We measure net capital inows in current US dollars
using International Financial Statistics data on current account decits, keeping with the
usual practice that considers errors and omissions as unreported capital ows. The main
point is the choice of an appropriate price index to convert this measure into constant
international dollars, the unit used in the Penn World Tables for real variables. In principle,
the trade and current account balances should be deated by the price of traded goods,
but the Penn World Tables do not report such price indices. We chose instead the price
of investment goods reported in the Penn World Tables. This seems to be a good proxy
because investment goods are mostly tradable|as suggested by the fact that their price
vary less across countries than that of consumption goods. The PPP adjustment will tend
to reduce the estimated size of capital ows relative to output in poor countries, because
those countries have a lower price of output (see Hsieh and Klenow (2007)).
13There are exceptions to this pattern. For instance, we nd  =  0:34 for the Philippines, 0:28 for Chile
and 0:47 for Botswana. See appendix C.
17One advantage of our PPP-adjusted estimates of cumulated capital ows is that they
can be compared to the measures of output or capital accumulation used in the development
accounting literature. The allocation puzzle, however, does not hinge on the particular
assumptions that we make in constructing those estimates. The deator chosen for the
PPP-adjustment of capital ows aects the volume but not the direction of capital ows.14
The theory can be tested using various measures of capital ows, which all deliver the same
broad message as the results presented in this section.
We present our estimates of observed and predicted net capital inows in Table 2. The
estimates for the predicted capital ows are constructed under the assumption that the
productivity catch-up follows the linear process: f (t) = min(t=T;1): Column 1 reports
observed net capital inows, as a fraction of initial output, D=Y0: The size of cumulated
capital inows is small, around 33 percent of 1980 output.
Column 2 reports the total predicted net capital inows based on equation (10). Predicted
capital ows are often an order of magnitude larger than realized ows. More importantly,
they often have the wrong sign. For instance, the model predicts that the average developing
country in our sample should have exported a quantity of capital amounting to 2.5 times
its initial output. While Lucas (1990) argued that the volume of capital owing from rich
to poor countries seemed puzzingly low, our results rather suggest that given the absence
of productivity catch-up and high level of distortions, capital should have own out of the
average developing country in our sample.15
Why is there such a discrepancy between the model and the data? The answer lies
in columns 3-6, which report the various components of (10). Column 3 indicates that
developing countries should have borrowed 7 percent of initial output on average to equate
domestic and foreign private returns on capital at the beginning of the sample period. This
is a small amount, less than one fourth of the observed capital inows. Likewise, the trend
14We used the price of output as a deator for current account balances in a previous version of this paper,
and obtained similar results.
15The results for average cumulated capital ows are dierent if the cross-country averages are weighted
by GDP or population. Then, we nd that the average developing country should receive capital inows,
because of the large weights of China and India. Whereas the predictions of the model for average capital
ows are sensitive to outliers, we found that the allocation puzzle is robust to the dierent weighting schemes.
The results are also qualitatively unchanged if we use the median instead of weighted averages.
18component reported in column 6 is also relatively small and similar in magnitude to observed
ows.
Most of the dierence between the model-predicted and the observed capital ows come
from the investment and savings components reported in columns 4 and 5. As discussed
earlier, both terms increase with the productivity catch-up parameter : The model implies
that, everything else equal, capital should ow to the countries that catch up relative to the
world technology frontier ( > 0), and ow out of the countries that fall behind ( < 0).
The average developing country in our sample falls in the second category ( =  0:1) and
thus should have exported capital. The capital outows coming from lower investment are
sizeable (29 percent of initial output) and those that come from lower savings are very large
(2.6 times initial output), reecting the high sensitivity of consumption-savings choices to
future income in a perfect foresight model.
For reasons discussed earlier, we should not expect the model to predict very precisely
the volume of capital ows to specic countries. Sovereign risk, nancial frictions or un-
certainty about future productivity will limit the extent to which countries rely on foreign
capital. However, the neoclassical growth model should do a good job of predicting the
broad direction of capital ows. This is where the model fails in a systematic and interesting
way. The observed allocation of capital ows across developing countries is the opposite
of the one predicted by the model. Consider rst the allocation of capital across regions.
We would expect net capital inows to Asia, the only region that catches up in terms of
productivity. Indeed, Table 2 reports that the investment component of capital inows to
the average Asian developing country should represent 81 percent of its initial output. Yet
Asia borrowed, over that period, only 12.5 percent of its initial output (col. 1).
By contrast, consider Africa. With an initial abundance of capital and a relative produc-
tivity decline, the model predicts large capital outows. Indeed, Table 2 indicates that the
outows related to the investment and convergence components amount to 42 percent and
28 percent of initial output respectively (columns 4 and 3). Yet Africa received more than
40 percent of its initial output in capital ows. Similarly, capital ows to Latin America
amounted to 37 percent of its initial output, in spite of a signicant relative productivity
19decline.
The same pattern is evident if we group countries by income levels rather than regions.
According to Table 1, poorer countries experienced lower productivity growth and so should
export more capital. Indeed, Table 2 shows that predicted capital inows increase with
income level from -492 percent of output for low income countries to 828 percent of output
for high-income non-OECD countries. Observed capital inows run in the exact opposite
direction: actual capital ows decrease with income per capita, from 58 percent of output
for low income countries to -54 percent for high-income non-OECD countries.
Figure 2 summarizes the puzzle. It reports actual against predicted capital ows. One
observes immediately that most countries are located in the `wrong' quadrants of the gure,
with predicted capital outows and observed capital inows, or vice versa. Figure 3 plots
observed capital ows against the three determinants identied in Proposition 1: the capital
gap (k   k0)=k0; initial debt d0=y0, and productivity catch-up : While observed capital
ows are positively (although weakly) correlated with the rst two components, we nd
strong evidence against the predictions of the model regarding productivity: countries with
faster productivity growth attract less capital inows.16 This is the allocation puzzle.
We ran a number of straightforward robustness checks.17 First, we checked that our
results were robust to the exclusion of African countries (which arguably may be too poor to
export capital while maintaining subsistence levels of consumption). Second, we started the
analysis in 1970 instead of 1980. The sample is much smaller (30 countries), but the pattern
of capital ows is very similar. Third, we split the sample according to whether Chinn and
Ito's (2007) index of nancial account openness is above or below the sample median. One
would a priori expect a better t between the model and the data for more nancially open
countries. Yet the results are similar for both groups of countries.18
16The gure reports the tted values from an OLS regression. The regression coecients are signicantly
negative for the productivity catch-up. They are not signicant for the capital gap or the initial debt.
17Results are available upon request. The following section presents additional robustness checks.
18The index of Chinn and Ito (2007) does not dierentiate between inows and outows. Hence it is
possible that it is too crude a measure of capital market liberalization. As pointed out to us by Peter Henry,
nancial frictions can account for our results if countries with  > 0 face restrictions on inows, whereas
countries with  < 0 face restrictions on outows.
20To summarize, standard growth theory can account for cross-country dierences in capital
accumulation, once we take into account cross-country dierences in productivity and capital
markets distortions. The same theory makes a strong and counterfactual prediction about
the direction of capital ows: the countries that grow faster should rely more on foreign
nancing. In fact, the countries that grow faster tend to receive less capital ows. The
puzzle here is not that developing countries receive little capital from advanced countries,
as Lucas argued. Rather, it is the allocation of capital across developing countries that
contradicts the theory in a fundamental way.
4 Robustness
Can the textbook model be rescued in a simple way? This section explore some alternatives:
introducing uncertainty about future productivity or non-reproducible capital in the model,
and controlling for international aid ows. The upshot is that our central result is robust to
these extensions.
4.1 Uncertainty and permanent productivity shocks
We emphasized earlier the importance of the assumption of perfect foresight for the saving
side of the model. Under perfect foresight, agents tend to borrow or lend heavily against
a certain future income. Uncertainty about the path of future productivity should dampen
the willingness of the domestic representative agent to borrow or lend.
We now consider what happens when agents expect future productivity growth to re-
main constant and equal to g: This is a reasonable approximation, in light of Easterly,
Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993) nding that output growth rates are unpredictable,
and uncorrelated across decades. In order to abstract from the complications associated
with precautionary savings, we solve the model under certainty equivalence and assume that
agents always expect productivity to grow at rate g with certainty. Under this assumption
we obtain the following result.
21Proposition 3 If agents always expect productivity to grow at rate g the ratio of cumulated
























Proof. See appendix A.
The only dierence between (16) and (10) is that the consumption smoothing term has
disappeared. The intuition is straightforward: when productivity is expected to grow at
rate g; the consumption-savings choices are the same as in the steady growth path with
no productivity catch-up. Productivity inuences capital ows only through the investment
term.
Column 7 in Table 2 reports estimates of Dn=Y0; as the sum of columns 3, 4 and 6.
The orders of magnitude are closer to the data. Another dierence with our previous results
is that the average developing country is now predicted to receive capital inows (although
signicantly less than the actual amount). However, the allocation puzzle still stands. As
shown in Figure 4, the predicted and actual net capital inows remain negatively correlated.
4.2 Non-reproducible capital
In a recent paper, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) argue that, while naive estimates of the marginal
product of capital vary enormously across countries, the returns to capital are essentially
the same once the estimates are adjusted for cross country dierences in non-reproducible
capital and in the relative price of investment and consumption goods. This adjustment is
especially important for developing countries that have a larger share of natural capital (in
particular land) in total capital. Their result oers another resolution to the Lucas puzzle:
if substantial dierences in capital-output ratio coexist with marginal product equalization,
then we should expect little, if any, capital ows between countries.
This paper adopts a dierent approach, based on the wedge between the private and
social marginal returns to capital. The cross country distribution of the private marginal
return to capital is compressed by the wedge . To illustrate, the top panels of Figure 5
22report the naive estimate of private returns (left), dened as RN = Y=K   ; and the
wedge-adjusted return (right), RW = (1   )(1 + RN) 1, against 2000 income per capita.
The left-hand side top panel indicates enormous variation in the naive estimate, between 3.6
percent (Singapore) and 104 percent (Uganda), with a mean of 17.5 percent. By contrast, the
wedge-adjusted return varies between -2.5 percent (Nigeria) and 14 percent (Malawi) with a
mean of 4.7 percent. The amount of compression is remarkable, given that the capital wedge
is not calibrated to ensure private returns equalization. Our results thus parallel those of
Caselli and Feyrer (2007): private returns to capital appear remarkably similar. This result
explains why there is no Lucas puzzle according to our estimates.
We now check the robustness of our results to allowing for non-reproducible capital.19








where X represents non-reproducible capital (assumed to be constant) and l denotes the
share of non-reproducible capital in output. Notice that this production technology is iso-










1 k. Non-reproducible capital matters, however, for estimating the capital
share k.
The production function is calibrated as follows. Like Caselli and Feyrer (2007), we obtain
an estimate of w = k +l, the total share of capital (reproducible and non-reproducible),
from Gollin (2002) supplemented by Bernanke and G urkaynak (2001), as one minus the
labor share. The private return to reproducible capital is (1   )(1 + kYt=Kt   ) while the
private return to non-reproducible capital is (1   )(lYt=Xt + P x
t )=P x
t 1 where P x
t denotes
the price of non-reproducible capital in terms of the nal good.20
In steady state, both returns must be equal and the rate of price appreciation must equal
19In this paper, we do not consider systematic variation across countries in the price of investment goods.
See Chatterjee and Naknoi (2007) for an analysis of capital ows along this line.
20We assume that the capital wedge applies equally to all forms of capital and that non-reproducible
capital does not depreciate.
23the rate of growth of real output: P x
t =P x
t 1 = gy: Solving for k; we obtain:
k =









where W = P xX + K denotes total wealth (natural and reproducible). This formula has
a simple interpretation. If there is no natural capital (X = 0 and W = K); it boils down
to k = w. With non-reproducible capital, two adjustments take place. First, only a
fraction K=W of total capital income wY goes to reproducible capital. This is the rst
term in brackets. Second, a faster growth rate gy or higher depreciation rate  mean a
faster price appreciation and a larger private return on non-reproducible capital relative to
reproducible capital. In both cases, returns on both types of capital can only be equated
if the reproducible capital share k increases. This is the second term in brackets.21 We
follow Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and obtain estimates of P xX from World Bank (2006). Our
estimated adjusted capital shares are reported in appendix C.
The bottom two panels of Figure 5 report the estimate of private returns to capital
once we adjust the share of reproducible capital. The bottom left panel reports estimates
of private returns without the capital wedge. We nd returns varying between 4.4 percent
(Thailand) and 29.5 percent (El Salvador), with a mean of 10.08 percent. Once we take into
account the capital wedge, the returns are further compressed.22 We nd returns varying
between 0.7 percent (Nigeria) and 11.5 percent (Malawi), with a mean of 4.9 percent.
Adjusting for non-reproducible capital does not change the essence of our results. Table 3
reports the predicted and actual capital ows in the adjusted model.23 The predicted capital
inows remain negative on average, and the model predictions for the allocation of capital
ows by income levels or by regions remain at odds with the data. Figure 6 shows the same
variables as Figure 3 for the model with non-reproducible capital. Again, predicted capital
ows are negatively correlated with productivity growth.
21These last two corrections are absent in Caselli and Feyrer (2007) who assume a common depreciation
rate and price appreciation for reproducible and non-reproducible capital.
22The capital wedges are recomputed for the model with non-reproducible capital to match the observed
investment rates. The adjustment for natural capital reduces the average level and variance of our capital
wedge estimates. The mean capital wedge is now only 4.5 percent.
23The actual capital ows are not the same as in 2, because the sample of countries is slightly smaller.
244.3 Ocial aid
The basic neoclassical framework may not be appropriate to predict ocial aid ows because
aid is not necessarily allocated to the countries with the highest expected returns on capital.
On the one hand, if aid has any eectiveness the ows of development aid should be positively
correlated with productivity growth. On the other hand, there is a selection bias, as the
countries that have received aid ows over long period of time are often those that have
failed to develop. In addition, the components of aid that are justied by humanitarian
reasons should be negatively correlated with growth. The large literature on development
aid has generally failed to nd a signicant relationship between aid and growth (see Rajan
and Subramanian (2005)).
That the neoclassical growth model does not capture well the determinants of aid ows
does not necessarily invalidate its predictions for net capital ows. If we modeled aid as
a lump-sum transfer to the representative agent in the model of section 2, then aid would
immediately leave the country, as the representative agent would nd it optimal to invest
it abroad given the lack of domestic investment opportunities. Because of the fungibility of
aid this would be true even if aid were earmarked to nance certain class of expenditures,
such as investment. The aid inow would be oset by an outow of exactly the same size,
and the predictions of the model would remain valid for net capital ows.
Things might be dierent, however, in the presence of nancial frictions. Then aid
could be used to relax some nancial constraints and to nance an increase in domestic
expenditures above and beyond what can be nanced by private capital ows. Or capital
controls could prevent aid inows from being completely oset by a capital outow. In those
cases, aid would not be neutral and its impact on the level of net capital ows should be
examined.
We now examine how aid inows are correlated with the model's predicted capital ows.
Our measure of ocial aid ows is the net overseas development assistance (net ODA) from
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This measure is available for all countries
in our sample, except Taiwan. According to Roodman (2006), DAC counts total grants and
25concessional development loans and subtracts principle repayments on these loans (hence the
`net').24 As shown in Appendix B, it is possible to compute the PPP-adjusted cumulated
net ODA ows normalized by initial GDP using the same method as for net capital ows.
To see how far aid ows can go in explaining the puzzle, we make the (extreme) assump-
tion that those ows were not oset at all by other types of capital ows. That is, we assume
that in the absence of aid ows the counterfactual net capital ows would have been equal







Under this assumption, removing aid ows might eliminate the puzzle, to the extent that
these ows are negatively correlated with the determinants of private capital ows. Table
4 reports the results for the aid-adjusted capital ows. Since net ODA ows are always
positive in our sample (all developing countries are net recipients), D0 is always smaller
than D: As a result, the average developing country is found to export capital net of
aid ows (23 percent of initial output, on average). The correlations between aid-adjusted
capital ows and the determinants of capital ows are reported in Figure 7. The correlation
becomes negative for capital scarcity and remains negative for productivity growth, although
no longer signicantly dierent from zero for the latter. A comparison of Figures 3 and 7,
reveals that aid ows must be negatively correlated with productivity growth.
We conclude that ocial aid ows play a role in explaining why the correlation between
capital inows and productivity growth is negative: many countries with poor productivity
performance are also net ocial aid recipients. However, aid ows per se do not resolve
the allocation puzzle. As Table 4 shows, Asia exports capital while the model predicts
substantial capital inows. Moreover, Figure 7 demonstrates that the observed aid-adjusted
capital ows are at best unresponsive to dierences in long term productivity growth.
24Our results are remain unchanged if we use instead Roodman's (2006) Net Aid Transfer measure.
265 Discussion
This section discusses some possible approaches to the resolution of the allocation puzzle.
It is meant as a tentative roadmap for future research, not as a denitive attempt to push
forward a particular explanation.25 We rst look at the puzzle from the point of view of the
literature on savings and growth. We then discuss the possible role of international trade
and that of domestic nancial frictions.
The allocation puzzle can be summarized in terms of the cross-country correlations be-
tween savings, investment and growth. Let us consider the following three variables in a
sample of developing countries: g, the average growth rate of productivity; s the average
savings rate and i the average investment rate. The net capital outows are measured by the
dierence between the savings rate and the investment rate, s i. The allocation puzzle is the
nding that capital outows are positively correlated with the growth rate of productivity
across countries:
cov(g;s   i) > 0;
or equivalently, that the savings rate is more correlated with productivity growth than the
investment rate:
cov(g;s) > cov(g;i): (18)
We argued that this is a puzzle for the simple neoclassical open-economy model of growth,
which predicts that the left-hand side of equation (18) is negative while the right-hand side
is positive.
5.1 Savings and growth
We already know from the literature on savings and growth that the model's rst prediction,
cov (g;s) < 0; is at odds with the data. Empirically, the savings rate is positively correlated
with growth (see, e.g., Mankiw et al. (1992)), and the explanations that have been put
25Indeed, the explanations reviewed below are not mutually exclusive, and are often complementary.
Moreover, the most relevant explanation could depend on the countries or the regions.
27forward in the literature for this positive correlation may help us to explain the allocation
puzzle.
One such class of explanations considers the causality from savings to growth. Note that g
is the growth rate in productivity, not output per capita, so the mechanism must involve some
endogeneity of domestic productivity to domestic savings. This is the case in a number of
closed-economy models of endogenous growth, but this feature does not easily survive perfect
capital mobility, which makes domestic savings a small component of the global savings pool.
For domestic savings to increase growth in the open economy, there must be a friction that
prevents domestic savings and foreign savings from being perfect substitutes. An example of
a model with those features is Aghion, Comin and Howitt (2006), in which domestic savings
matters for innovation because it fosters the involvement of domestic intermediaries with a
superior monitoring technology.
Another class of explanations considers the causality from growth to savings.26 In
Modigliani's (1970) life cycle model faster growth raises aggregate savings by increasing
the saving of younger richer cohorts relative to the dissaving of older poorer cohorts. Other
authors have pointed to a number of problems with the life-cycle model, and put forward
an alternative theory based on consumption habit ( Carroll and Weil (1994), Carroll et al.
(2000) ).
Whether the models discussed above can explain the allocation puzzle is an open question
for future research. The answer is not obvious a priori: those models can account for a
positive correlation between savings and growth, but cannot necessarily explain why this
correlation is larger than that between investment and growth. The challenge is to explain
why cov(s;g) is larger than cov(i;g) when the averages are taken over long periods of time.
5.2 Trade
Another way of presenting the allocation puzzle is that the ratio of net exports to GDP is
positively correlated with the productivity growth rate across countries. Looking at this from
26Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000) present evidence suggesting that the causality runs from growth to
savings.
28the perspective of trade, the allocation puzzle is consistent with the view in development
economics that emphasizes the importance of a competitive sector as an engine of moderniza-
tion and growth (see Rodrik (2006) for a recent exposition). This also seems consistent with
the pattern of capital ows observed in the recent period, in which the developing countries
that grew the fastest (the Southeast Asian emerging market countries) were also those that
had the largest trade surpluses.
Developing a dynamic general equilibrium model of this view is beyond the scope of
this paper, but one can speculate on the assumptions and properties that such a framework
would have. For instance, suppose that productivity take-os originate in the tradable sector
before spilling over to the nontradable sector. Then, the initial phase of the take-o should be
associated with a surge in net exports, and capital outows.27 One could add a \mercantilist"
twist to the story by assuming that the country aims to maintain a competitive real exchange
rate so as to preserve and develop its export sector during the take-o phase. This could be
achieved by repressing domestic demand, using capital controls or other forms of domestic
nancial repression. Those factors would magnify the size of the capital outows associated
with the economic take-o.
To restate the argument in the terms of the previous section, developing countries with
higher productivity growth g tend to be countries in which the tradable sector is larger
relative to the nontradable sector. Because domestic demand is constrained by the relative
underdevelopment of the nontradable sector, these countries also have a higher savings rate
s. The allocation puzzle would be explained if savings increase more than investment in the
productivity take-o.
It remains to be seen whether a calibrated model designed along those lines can explain
the cross-country correlation between growth and capital ows that we observe in the data,
and whether other implications of the model (e.g., for the relative sizes of the nontradable
27In equilibrium this would happen only under some conditions. On the one hand the consumption of
tradables would be held back by the low supply of nontradables. On the other hand, the consumption
of tradables should be stimulated by the real exchange rate appreciation associated with the take-o. Net
exports should increase if the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods is suciently
low relative to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption (see Obstfeld and Rogo (1996,
chapter 4)).
29and tradable sectors, and for the real exchange rate) t the facts.
5.3 Domestic nancial frictions
International nancial frictions that increase the cost of external nance relative to domestic
nance cannot explain the puzzle: as mentioned earlier, they can mute the absolute size of
capital ows, not change their direction. But domestic nancial frictions might be able to
do so, because of the impact they have on the relationship between savings, investment and
growth. As shown by Gertler and Rogo (1990) and Matsuyama (2004), domestic nancial
frictions can reverse the direction of capital ows between rich and poor countries. It would
be interesting to know whether they might have the same eect between high-growth and
low-growth countries.
Low domestic nancial development may constrain domestic demand|and increase do-
mestic savings|in several ways. First, it constrains the residents' ability to borrow against
future income or store value in sound nancial instruments (see Caballero, Farhi and Gour-
inchas (2007)). Second, it constrains their ability to insure eciently and encourages pre-
cautionary savings (see Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007)). Further, an inecient
nancial intermediation system should also reduce the responsiveness of investment to pro-
ductivity growth.
In terms of our previous discussion, and taking productivity growth g as an exogenous
determinant of savings and investment, we would expect to nd that cov(g;s) is decreasing
with the level of nancial development, while cov(g;i) is increasing with the level of nancial
development. Thus cov(g;s i) would be decreasing with the level of nancial development,
and could be positive for countries with a low level of nancial development. For instance,
in Caballero et al. (2007), nancially underdeveloped countries run larger current account
surpluses if they grow faster. The explanation for the allocation puzzle, then, would be that
the correlations in our sample are determined by nancially underdeveloped countries. Some
of these countries would have high growth in spite of their nancial underdevelopment (e.g.,
China), whereas others would remain trapped in a path with low growth.28 The allocation
28This association seem at odd with the fact that nancial development seems good for growth (King and
30puzzle would result from cov(g;s   i) > 0 conditional on low nancial development.
This explanation takes a dierent angle than, but is not inconsistent with, the other
two. Domestic credit constraints have been mentioned as a possible explanation in the
literature trying to explain the positive correlation between saving and growth (Carroll and
Weil (1994)), and also as a way of maintaining a competitive real exchange rate (Jeanne
(2007)).
6 Concluding Comments
This paper establishes a puzzling stylized fact: capital tends to ow more toward countries
with lower productivity growth and lower investment. This is puzzling for neoclassical models
of growth|in fact, this makes one wonder if the textbook neoclassical framework is the
right model at all to think about the link betwee international nancial integration and
development.
Part of the puzzle is accounted for by aid ows, but this is far from the whole story.
We have discussed three lines of explanations that seem the most promising to us for future
research: one focuses on the relationship between savings and growth, the second one gives
the key role to trade, while the last one emphasizes domestic nancial underdevelopment.
It seems important to know more about which channels explain the puzzling behavior of
capital ows to developing countries if one wants to understand how international nancial
integration helps economic development.
Levine (1993)). However one must control for the initial level of development. The least developed countries
tend to be less developed nancially, but they have more scope for catching up.
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34(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Investment Rate Total Convergence Productivity Trend Wedge Catch-up Obs.
(percent of output)  sk  
Non-OECD countries 13.47 0.13 -0.93 14.27 11.58 -0.10 69
Low Income 8.56 -0.14 -1.56 10.26 18.76 -0.22 27
Lower Middle Income 14.06 0.29 -1.64 15.42 8.84 -0.15 23
Upper Middle Income 15.69 0.40 -1.35 16.64 6.13 -0.06 13
High Income (Non-OECD) 28.52 0.20 5.52 22.79 1.62 0.54 6
Africa 10.27 -0.66 -1.20 12.12 16.00 -0.17 32
Latin-America 13.40 0.39 -2.67 15.69 8.50 -0.24 20
Asia 19.59 1.34 1.61 16.64 6.90 0.19 17
except China and India 13.40 0.13 -1.05 14.33 11.62 -0.12 67
China and India 15.76 0.40 3.02 12.34 10.35 0.53 2
except Africa 16.24 0.82 -0.70 16.13 7.77 -0.04 37






~ k(1 )gn; Trend: ~ k(1 )(gn +    1). Unweighted country averages.
3
5(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Capital Flows D=Y0 Dp=Y0 Dc=Y0 Di=Y0 Ds=Y0 Dt=Y0 Dn=Y0 Obs.
(percent of initial output) (3){(6) (3)+(4)+(6)
Non-OECD countries 32.77 -255.21 7.13 -28.77 -260.06 26.49 4.85 69
Low Income 58.08 -491.94 -11.04 -50.47 -457.39 26.96 -34.55 27
Lower Middle Income 37.02 -358.64 17.38 -62.62 -338.16 24.76 -20.48 23
Upper Middle Income 12.94 -80.48 22.85 -40.99 -98.65 36.31 18.18 13
High Income (Non-OECD) -54.43 827.99 15.50 225.15 577.59 9.75 250.40 6
Africa 40.97 -452.75 -28.14 -42.38 -410.36 28.14 -42.39 32
Latin-America 36.89 -478.74 20.96 -100.07 -435.02 35.40 -43.72 20
Asia 12.48 379.61 57.25 80.75 228.69 12.92 150.92 17
except China and India 33.65 -289.49 7.00 -33.85 -289.89 27.24 0.39 67
China and India 3.21 893.39 11.39 141.57 739.14 1.29 154.25 2
except Africa 25.67 -84.36 37.63 -16.99 -130.07 25.07 45.71 37
Table 2: Predicted and actual capital ows between 1980 and 2000, in percent of initial output. D=Y0 is the observed ratio.
Predicted capital ows Dp=Y0 given by (10). Convergence component Dc=Y0 given by (11). Investment component
Di=Y0 given by (13). Saving component Ds=Y0 given by (14). Trend component Dt=Y0 given by (12). Linear
specication for f(:): f(t) = min(t=T;1). Unweighted country averages.
3
6(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Capital Flows D=Y0 Dp=Y0 Dc=Y0 Di=Y0 Ds=Y0 Dt=Y0 Dn=Y0 Obs.
(percent of initial output) (3){(6) (3)+(4)+(6)
Non-OECD countries 38.79 -310.53 12.24 -39.10 -311.35 27.68 0.82 62
Low Income 61.55 -504.76 -9.72 -42.09 -478.62 25.67 -26.14 22
Lower Middle Income 43.33 -396.42 17.51 -68.68 -370.83 25.58 -25.59 23
Upper Middle Income 20.95 -130.74 24.40 -50.23 -142.43 37.51 11.69 13
High Income (Non-OECD) -54.51 667.36 63.18 183.59 401.72 18.86 265.64 4
Africa 40.68 -511.50 -22.81 -50.09 -466.33 27.72 -45.17 28
Latin-America 47.79 -544.93 20.77 -111.53 -492.28 38.11 -52.65 19
Asia 23.86 361.53 66.85 73.15 207.14 14.40 154.39 15
except China and India 39.98 -349.95 12.27 -45.04 -345.75 28.56 -4.21 60
China and India 3.06 872.27 11.29 139.03 720.63 1.33 151.64 2
Table 3: Predicted and Actual Capital Flows between 1980 and 2000, in percent of initial output. The predicted capital
ows are computed using the model with non-reproducible capital. Unweighted country averages.
3
7Ocial Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Flows D0=Y0 B=Y0 Dp=Y0 Dn=Y0 Obs.
(percent of initial output)
Non-OECD countries -23.17 58.43 -275.96 1.71 68
Low Income 58.08 106.34 -491.94 -34.55 27
Lower Middle Income 37.02 35.39 -358.64 -20.48 23
Upper Middle Income 12.94 15.88 -80.48 18.18 13
High Income (Non-OECD) -54.46 16.31 762.39 256.78 5
Africa -45.16 86.13 -452.75 -42.39 32
Latin-America 13.59 23.30 -478.74 -43.72 20
Asia -25.16 46.92 331.08 146.69 16
except China and India -23.64 59.86 -311.40 -2.91 66
China and India 3.21 10.96 893.39 154.25 2
































































































0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Investment/GDP




























































































-20 -10 0 10 20
Predicted Capital Inflows





























































































































































































































































-.5 0 .5 1 1.5
long run productivity catch-up
®
Figure 3: Actual capital inows (as a share of initial GDP) against their determinants:
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Figure 4: Predicted and actual capital inows (as a share of initial GDP). Model with
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Figure 6: Actual land-adjusted capital inows (as a share of initial GDP) against their
determinants: capital gap (k   k0)=k0; initial debt to GDP ratio (d0=y0); and productivity
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Figure 7: Observed aid-adjusted capital inows (as a share of initial GDP) against their
determinants: capital gap (k   k0)=k0; initial debt to GDP ratio (d0=y0); and productivity
catch-up (), 1980-2000.
44A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.















At the beginning of time 0 external debt jumps from e d0 to e d+
0 = e d0 + e k   e k0 to nance the initial
capital gap. Note that although output is produced with the equilibrium level of capital e k from
period 0 onward, we normalize debt by the level of output before capital has jumped to e k.
We then compute e dT. Let us denote by gt = At=At 1 the growth rate of productivity. Dividing
the budget constraint (4) by NtAt and using Nt+1=Nt = n, At+1=At = gt+1, e kt = e k gives
e ct + ngt+1e k + Re dt = Re k + ngt+1e dt+1 + e w + e z; (20)
where the wage and transfer per eciency unit of labor are constant and given by e w = (1   )e k
and e z = 
1 Re k.
After time T the economy is in a steady growth path with gt+1 = g; e dt = e dT and e ct = e cT.
Equation (20) implies
e dT = e k +
e w + e z   e cT
R   ng : (21)
The next step is to compute e cT = cT=AT = c0gt=(1 + )A0gt = e c0=(1 + ). The level of
net wealth per capita at the beginning of period 0 is k   d+
0 = k0   d0. Integrating the budget












(wt + zt) + R(k0   d0):
Using ct = A0e c0gt and wt + zt = (e w + e z)A0(1 + t)gt this equation implies










(1 + t)(e w + e z) + e k0   e d0
!
: (22)
Using this expression to substitute out e cT = e c0=(1 + ) from (21) gives
e dT = e k  













(   t): (23)
Finally, using this expression to substitute out e dT from (19) gives the expression in Proposition 1.

45A.2 Comparing dierent measures of capital inows.






Our results are robust to using other measures of foreign borrowing. For example, capital inows









This is the measure we used to introduce the allocation puzzle in Figure 1. Another possible
measure of capital inows is the change in the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP between time








We show that these measures are all increasing with the productivity catch-up ; under as-
sumptions 1 and 2 and the additional requirement that f(t) increases with t. We have already
shown this property for m1. We now show that m2 and m3 are also increasing with . First we
derive a closed-form expression for e dt and show that it is increasing with  for any time t. The
budget constraint (20) can be rewritten:
e dt   e k =
ng
R
1 + f(t + 1)
1 + f(t)

e dt+1   e k

+
e w + e z   e ct
R :
Iterating forward then gives:






s 1 + f(t + s)
1 + f(t)
e w + e z   e ct+s
R :
Then using (1 + f(t + s))e ct+s = e c0 and expression (22), one can substitute out e c0 from the
expression above to obtain,









(f(t + s)   f(s))
e w + e z
R  
e k0   e d0
1 + f(t)
; (26)
which is increasing with , for any t, provided that the second term is positive and the third term
is negative. The second term is positive because f() is increasing monotonically. The third term
is negative if external debt is not larger than the stock of capital at time 0 (e d0  e k0).












(gt+1e dt+1   e dt):
Then using gt+1 = g(1 + f(t + 1))=(1 + f(t)) and (26) to substitute out e dt and e dt+1 we obtain
(after some manipulations):
gt+1e dt+1   e dt =














(g(f(t + 1 + s)   f(s))
 (f(t + s)   f(s))
e w + e z
R   (g   1)
e k0   e d0
1 + f(t)
:
On can check that all the terms on the righ-hand side are increasing with . Hence m2 is increasing
with  too.
The predictions of the model, therefore, are qualitatively the same for the three measures of
capital ows. However, there is a sense in which those predictions are more robust for measure (9)
than for measures (24) and (25). If the allocation puzzle is observed with measure (9) then it must
also hold with the two other measures. The opposite may not be true. This is another reason to
use measure (9) as a benchmark when we look at the data.
We will now assume that m1, m2 and m3 are functions of  that could be dierent from the
functions derived in the model. One could say that the puzzle is stronger with measure 1 than
with measure 2 if having the puzzle for measure 1 implies that we have it for measure 2 too, i.e.,
if the fact that m1 is decreasing with  implies that m2 is also decreasing with . We denote this
relationship by m1  m2. Then, under the simplifying assumption that debt accumulation is a
constant fraction of GDP (that is Dt+1   Dt = m2Yt for t = 0;::;T   1), we can establish the
following ordering,
m1  m2  m3:
Using Yt = (1 + f(t))ntY0 we have





































If m2 is decreasing with , so is m3, which establishes m2  m3.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
For t  1 we have
skt =
Kt+1   (1   )Kt
Yt
=
At+1Nt+1e k   (1   )AtNte k
AtNte k = (gt+1n +    1)e k(1 ):
In period 0 this expression is augmented by a term reecting that the level of capital per eciency
unit of labor jumps up from e k0 to e k at the beginning of the period,




= (g1n +    1)e k(1 ) +

























~ k   ~ k0
~ k
0




~ k   ~ k0
~ k
0
+ ( g   g)n~ k(1 ) + (gn +    1)~ k(1 );
where  g = 1
T
Pt=T 1
t=0 gt+1 is the average productivity growth rate. Under the additional assumption
that  is small,  g can be expressed as a function of  as



















where the rst line uses the denition of t; and the last equality uses T =  and 0 = 0: We can










~ k(1 )gn + (gn +    1)~ k(1 ):

A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. The only dierence is that the consumption path
is determined as if future productivity were growing at rate g. This implies that consumption at
time t is given by an equation similar to (22) with  set to zero:










(e w + e z) + e k   e dt
!
;
= e w + e z + (R   ng)(e k   e dt):
Using this expression to substitute e ct out of (20) gives,
e k   e dt+1 =
g
gt+1
(e k   e dt);
=
1 + f(t)
1 + f(t + 1)
(e k   e dt):
Iterating from t = 0 to t = T gives
e k   e dT =
1
1 + 




(e k0   e d0):
Using this expression to substitute out e dT from (19) gives (16). 
B Measuring PPP-adjusted Capital Flows.
For a given country, data expressed in constant international dollars (the unit used in the Penn






where CGDPt (RGDPt) is domestic GDP expressed in current (constant) international dollar and
Pt is a price deator. The ratio CGDP=RGDP operates the conversion from constant international
dollar into current international dollar, and P operates the conversion from current international
dollar into current US dollar. We dene the deator P as the price of investment goods reported
in the Penn World Tables, for reasons given in section 3.2. Multiplying a variable in constant
international dollar, X, by the deator Q gives its value in terms of current US dollars, X$ = QX.
The deator Q can be used to obtain PPP-adjusted estimates of the observed cumulated capital






t;29 and use the formulas DT = D$


















The estimate of the initial net external debt in US dollar (D$
0) is obtained from Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006)'s External Wealth of Nations Mark II database (EWN), as the dierence between
(the opposite of) the reported net international investment position (NIIP) and the cumulated errors
and omissions (EO) cumulated between 1970 and 1980.30 The same approach is used to construct
estimates of the initial debt output ratio d0=y0, which we need to compute the right-hand-side of
(10).











t is the current U.S. dollar value of the net overseas assistance in year t from all

























29Alternatively, one could use Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)'s estimate of the net external
position in year 2000. The dierence between the two estimates lies in the treatment of valuation
eects due to asset price and currency movements. The size and relative importance of these
valuation eects has increased over time. We do not attempt to incorporate these eects in this
paper.
30In keeping with usual practice, we interpret errors and omissions as unreported capital inows.
50C Data
Table 5: Data for 66 non-OECD countries, as well as Korea, Mexico and Turkey. The
last three columns report the share of reproducible capital income k, the naive (RN) and
wedge-adjusted (RW) returns for the case with non-reproducible capital described in section
4.2.
Country Start End sk(%) g(%) n(%) (%)  k RN(%) RW(%)
Angola 1985 1996 6.16 -2.32 2.85 12.92 -0.36 . . .
Argentina 1980 2000 15.84 0.83 1.49 2.90 -0.15 0.25 6.61 6.14
Bangladesh 1980 2000 10.41 1.73 2.62 13.99 0.02 0.22 15.48 6.02
Benin 1980 2000 8.00 -0.00 3.02 19.41 -0.28 0.16 14.84 6.99
Bolivia 1980 2000 8.38 -0.23 2.46 12.51 -0.32 0.19 9.87 5.28
Botswana 1980 1999 16.95 3.84 3.56 11.07 0.47 0.43 27.71 4.79
Brazil 1980 2000 18.00 0.43 2.38 2.70 -0.23 0.28 7.50 5.88
Burkina Faso 1980 2000 10.33 0.11 2.41 14.50 -0.27 0.19 10.33 3.27
Cameroon 1980 1995 8.72 -1.22 2.80 17.74 -0.37 0.13 6.75 3.28
Chile 1980 2000 17.32 2.88 1.85 6.57 0.28 0.32 11.36 3.22
China 1982 2000 19.58 4.81 1.82 7.69 0.74 0.26 10.40 4.26
Colombia 1980 2000 11.79 0.74 2.61 11.42 -0.18 0.24 12.14 3.73
Congo, Rep. 1980 2000 12.95 3.17 2.90 6.78 0.28 0.21 11.88 10.18
Costa Rica 1980 2000 15.30 -0.58 3.02 6.21 -0.36 0.22 7.81 5.80
Cyprus 1980 1996 23.57 5.59 1.08 1.43 0.84 . . .
C^ ote d'Ivoire 1980 2000 5.74 -1.40 3.70 17.09 -0.46 0.15 13.71 8.45
Dominican Republic 1980 2000 13.26 1.57 2.61 9.82 -0.02 0.23 13.83 7.52
Ecuador 1980 2000 16.50 -0.47 3.08 3.40 -0.27 0.34 9.75 4.29
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 2000 7.42 2.73 2.62 23.81 0.24 0.13 15.26 7.89
El Salvador 1980 2000 7.10 -1.01 2.28 16.90 -0.41 0.32 29.54 6.03
Ethiopia 1980 2000 4.17 -0.50 2.61 32.68 -0.35 0.11 17.74 6.57
Fiji 1980 1999 12.64 1.10 1.65 5.83 -0.10 0.25 12.04 8.39
Gabon 1980 2000 11.53 1.14 2.44 8.61 -0.10 0.17 8.45 7.86
Ghana 1980 2000 6.11 1.14 3.40 17.44 -0.10 0.16 16.11 9.36
Guatemala 1980 2000 7.35 0.26 2.76 18.65 -0.25 0.19 15.88 4.89
Haiti 1980 1998 5.46 2.25 2.09 31.63 0.14 . . .
Honduras 1980 2000 12.91 -1.26 3.44 8.35 -0.46 0.23 7.37 2.84
Hong Kong, China 1980 2000 25.31 3.56 1.87 2.49 0.41 0.31 6.41 3.52
India 1980 2000 11.95 3.04 2.33 13.01 0.31 0.15 7.43 5.73
Indonesia 1981 2000 16.91 1.74 2.46 9.75 0.00 0.26 9.51 1.71
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1980 2000 19.84 -0.07 3.10 1.20 -0.28 0.24 7.76 9.10
Israel 1980 2000 24.97 1.88 2.72 0.09 0.03 0.31 5.52 5.26
continued on next page
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Country Start End sk(%) g(%) n(%) (%)  k RN(%) RW(%)
Jamaica 1980 2000 15.39 -0.62 1.80 0.25 -0.37 0.34 7.70 5.84
Jordan 1980 2000 15.57 -1.12 5.09 9.98 -0.44 0.31 15.22 2.91
Kenya 1980 2000 8.33 0.76 3.70 14.43 -0.18 0.19 13.22 6.39
Korea, Rep. 1980 2000 34.05 4.13 1.83 -0.08 0.61 0.35 6.12 4.32
Madagascar 1980 2000 2.75 -1.50 2.84 38.59 -0.47 0.07 12.71 6.92
Malawi 1980 2000 9.24 1.84 2.64 10.56 0.04 0.18 14.50 11.54
Malaysia 1980 2000 24.42 2.65 3.07 4.31 0.21 0.31 8.74 3.54
Mali 1980 2000 7.83 -0.08 2.44 18.46 -0.29 0.12 9.80 7.19
Mauritius 1980 2000 11.96 3.85 1.62 11.66 0.53 0.38 27.99 9.08
Mexico 1980 2000 18.13 -0.74 2.95 3.34 -0.39 0.36 11.75 5.38
Morocco 1980 2000 12.74 0.86 2.75 7.91 -0.16 0.34 17.46 5.62
Mozambique 1980 2000 3.07 -2.52 1.93 36.89 -0.56 0.10 19.16 6.81
Nepal 1980 2000 15.45 0.64 2.29 8.65 -0.18 0.24 10.31 4.65
Niger 1980 1995 6.65 -1.58 3.28 13.88 -0.38 0.11 6.19 7.89
Nigeria 1980 2000 8.31 -1.82 2.93 14.90 -0.50 0.16 4.98 0.69
Pakistan 1980 2000 11.34 3.20 2.57 14.14 0.34 0.22 14.82 5.02
Panama 1980 2000 18.36 0.09 2.64 3.00 -0.28 0.27 5.11 3.69
Papua New Guinea 1980 1999 11.18 -0.19 2.86 9.34 -0.29 . . .
Paraguay 1980 2000 12.78 0.31 3.23 11.90 -0.24 0.33 17.89 1.95
Peru 1980 2000 18.02 -1.20 2.63 1.14 -0.44 0.37 10.39 6.03
Philippines 1980 2000 14.95 -0.40 2.73 5.84 -0.34 0.35 15.17 5.92
Rwanda 1980 2000 4.34 -2.99 2.96 33.93 -0.62 0.08 11.55 4.54
Senegal 1980 2000 6.50 0.03 2.88 19.25 -0.28 0.17 16.68 7.31
Singapore 1980 1996 44.14 4.29 2.94 -2.48 0.50 0.47 9.05 6.54
South Africa 1980 2000 9.52 -0.25 2.86 9.24 -0.33 0.29 18.39 8.58
Sri Lanka 1980 2000 13.45 1.33 1.91 10.57 -0.06 0.20 9.41 5.19
Syrian Arab Republic 1980 2000 11.64 1.69 3.92 13.04 0.00 0.17 11.60 7.42
Taiwan 1980 1997 19.05 5.42 1.56 8.24 0.84 . . .
Tanzania 1980 2000 18.89 -1.39 3.27 -0.96 -0.46 . . .
Thailand 1980 2000 31.30 3.64 2.18 0.04 0.46 0.31 4.42 4.00
Togo 1980 2000 7.47 -2.71 2.92 16.06 -0.59 0.20 11.04 1.80
Trinidad and Tobago 1980 2000 10.18 -0.76 1.57 10.06 -0.39 0.18 9.09 7.02
Tunisia 1980 2000 14.41 2.19 2.89 7.83 0.09 0.30 15.81 6.80
Turkey 1980 2000 16.87 0.54 2.76 5.96 -0.21 0.28 8.32 3.31
Uganda 1980 2000 2.84 0.86 2.65 51.47 -0.15 . . .
Uruguay 1980 2000 11.65 2.37 0.66 7.61 0.15 0.29 13.46 5.85
Venezuela, RB 1980 2000 14.35 -1.48 2.86 1.71 -0.47 0.28 7.51 6.78
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